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I t is common for a firm to make use of multiple suppliers of different delivery lead times, reliabilities, and costs. In thisstudy, we are concerned with the joint pricing and inventory control problem for such a firm that has a quick-response
supplier and a regular supplier that both suffer random disruptions, and faces price-sensitive random demands. We aim
at characterizing the optimal ordering and pricing policies in each period over a planning horizon, and analyzing the
impacts of supply source diversification. We show that, when both suppliers are unreliable, the optimal inventory policy
in each period is a reorder point policy and the optimal price is decreasing in the starting inventory level in that period.
In addition, we show that having supply source diversification or higher supplier reliability increases the firm’s optimal
profit and lowers the optimal selling price. We also demonstrate that, with the selling price as a decision, a supplier may
receive even more orders from the firm after an additional supplier is introduced. For the special case where the quick-
response supplier is perfectly reliable, we further show that the optimal inventory policy is of a base-stock type and the
optimal pricing policy is a list-price policy with markdowns.
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1. Introduction
Supply disruption, which may result from various
causes ranging from accidents and disasters, labor
strikes, to quality issues and machine breakdowns,
has been a challenge faced by many firms. In practice,
source diversification and demand/pricing manage-
ment have been two widely used strategies for miti-
gating the impacts of supply disruption. In this study,
we are concerned with jointly determining pricing
and inventory replenishment strategies for a firm that
has dual unreliable supply sources and faces price-
sensitive random demands. Due to possible disrup-
tion, the suppliers may or may not be able to deliver
an order in a period, and the delivery capability of
each supplier evolves in a Markovian nature over
time. Motivated by the observation that many firms
use a quick-response, but more costly, supplier that
can deliver the firm’s order relatively quickly, plus a
less responsive and also less costly supplier for its
regular supply (see, e.g., Fisher et al. 1994), in this
study, we focus on the case where the delivery lead
times for the two suppliers are zero (for the quick-
response supplier) and one (for the regular supplier)
period of time, respectively, when they are capable of
delivery. This also captures a popular setting where a
firm has two supply sources: one is local or in-house
production which tends to be more expensive, more
reliable, and can deliver in a shorter time; while the
other is non-local/outsourcing which tends to be less
reliable and takes more time for delivery. We aim at
(a) characterizing the optimal joint ordering and pric-
ing policies that maximize the firm’s expected total
discounted profit over a planning horizon, and (b)
analyzing the impacts of supply source diversification
and supplier reliability on the firm’s optimal profit, its
optimal pricing and inventory policies, its customers,
and its suppliers.
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This study is related to three streams of research
literature: (i) procurement from multiple unreliable
suppliers; (ii) inventory control with multiple deliv-
ery modes; and (iii) coordination of pricing and
inventory decisions. Many researchers, including
Anupindi and Akella (1993), Chen et al. (2001), Tom-
lin and Wang (2005), Dada et al. (2007), and Federgru-
en and Yang (2011), have studied inventory systems
with multiple suppliers and random yield. The stud-
ies that are closely related to ours are those of dual-
sourcing inventory replenishment models, assuming
that different suppliers may suffer different random
disruptions and charge different unit costs. See, for
example, Tomlin and Snyder (2007), Yang et al.
(2009), G€urler and Parlar (1997), Chopra et al. (2007),
Tomlin (2009), and Gumus et al. (2012). In particular,
for the case where a firm has one perfectly reliable
supplier and one unreliable supplier, Yang et al.
(2009) discuss the value of information on the uncer-
tain supplier’s reliability; for the case when both sup-
pliers are subject to disruptions, G€urler and Parlar
(1997) derive an expression for the average cost objec-
tive function under a given (q, r) policy, and then
develop numerical approaches to evaluate the objec-
tive function for determining the optimal q and r. All
these studies assume zero lead time for all suppliers.
The second stream of related research is on inven-
tory control with multiple delivery modes/supply
lead times. In these studies, the research question
addressed is the structure of optimal inventory policy
for each supplier. Daniel (1963) is the first to consider
a multi-period single-stage model with two shipping
modes, with lead times being 0 and 1, respectively.
Fukuda (1964) extends Daniel (1963) to the case where
the lead times of the two supply modes are L and L+1,
respectively, for a general non-negative integer L.
Whittemore and Saunders (1977) consider the dual-
supplier problem with lead times of arbitrary lengths,
and demonstrate that the optimal control policy is
extremely complicated and the parameters of the
optimal control policy are state-dependent if the
difference in lead times is greater than 1. Feng et al.
(2006) study the problem with multiple consecutive
delivery modes, and show that only the fastest two
modes have optimal base stock. Due to the complex-
ity of the optimal policies with general lead times,
among others, Veeraraghavan and Scheller-Wolf
(2008) focus on the evaluation of two simple classes of
heuristic policies, viz., “single index” and “dual
index” policies. In all these studies, suppliers are
assumed to be perfectly reliable and the selling price
is assumed to be exogenously given.
The third stream of research related to our work is
the coordination of pricing and inventory decisions.
Several excellent survey studies in this area have been
published (e.g., Chen and Simchi-Levi 2012); and the
reader is referred to those sources for more discus-
sions. In this line of research, the supplier is generally
assumed to be reliable. See, for instance, Federgruen
and Heching (1999), Zhao and Wang (2002), and Chen
and Simchi-Levi (2004). There are only a few studies
that consider joint pricing and inventory management
for systems with supply uncertainty, including Li and
Zheng (2006), Chao et al. (2008), Feng (2010), Feng
and Shi (2012), Li et al. (2013a, 2013b), and Chen et al.
(2013). Among them, the most related work to ours is
Chen et al. (2013), in which the authors consider the
joint optimal pricing and inventory control problem
for a system with price-sensitive demands and multi-
ple random-yield suppliers. Its major result is that the
optimal inventory replenishment policy for each sup-
plier is a near reorder point policy, that is, there exists
a reorder point, above which no order is placed and
below which a positive amount is ordered for almost
every inventory level, and the optimal price may not
be monotone in the starting inventory level.
The model in this study captures the several main
features addressed in the above three streams of
research (i.e., multiple sourcing, different lead times/
shipping modes, and coordination of pricing and
inventory decisions). The research issues addressed
in this study include, besides the structure of the
dynamic optimal pricing and inventory control poli-
cies, the impacts of supply source diversification and
supplier reliability on the firm’s optimal profit and
operational policies, its customers, and its suppliers.
We show that, when both suppliers are unreliable, the
optimal inventory policy from each supplier is a re-
order point policy and the optimal selling price in
each period is decreasing in the starting inventory
level of that period. In addition, we show that, diver-
sifying supply source and/or improving supplier reli-
ability increase the firm’s expected profit and lower
the optimal selling price; hence, they benefit both the
firm and its customers. We also demonstrate that,
with the selling price as a decision, a supplier may
receive even more orders from the firm after an addi-
tional supplier is introduced, which seems counter-
intuitive and is different from the result in the case
when the selling price is exogenously given. For the
special case where the quick-response supplier is per-
fectly reliable, we further show that the optimal
inventory policy is of a base-stock type for each sup-
plier and the optimal pricing policy is a list-price pol-
icy with markdowns.
Although random disruption can be treated as a
special case of random yield, compared to Chen et al.
(2013), our model captures more features, such as
Markovian uncertainties and different lead times of
suppliers, and we obtain richer structures of the opti-
mal policy. Moreover, in addition to deriving the opti-
mal policy, we are able to identify the impacts of
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source diversification and suppliers reliabilities,
which have not been addressed in Chen et al. (2013)
or other related literature.
The contributions of this study are threefold.
Firstly, this study is the first to consider the joint pric-
ing and inventory control problem for a firm with
dual unreliable suppliers of different lead times and
Markovian disruption risks. We characterize the
firm’s optimal joint pricing and inventory policies
and carry out several important sensitivity analyses.
Second, this study is also the first to analyze the
impact of source diversification on the firm, on its
suppliers, and on its customers in a dynamic and sto-
chastic setting. Our results align with economic intu-
itions that a more diversified supply benefits both the
firm and its customers; however and interestingly, we
also find that the incumbent supplier may receive
more orders after a new supplier is introduced if the
selling pricing is an endogenous decision. Lastly, this
study is also the first to investigate the impact of sup-
ply reliability. Our results show that, in the presence
of disruption risks, both the firm and its customers
benefit from higher supply reliability, but this may
not be true for the suppliers. Altogether, this study
sheds light on how a firm should coordinate inven-
tory, sourcing, and the selling price to manage disrup-
tion risks.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows.
In section 2, we describe the model and introduce the
dynamic programming formulation. In section 3, we
characterize the structure of the optimal inventory
and pricing policies and carry out several sensitivity
analyses, which lead to some important insights on
the impacts of dual sourcing and supply reliability. In
section 4 we focus on the special case where the
quick-response supplier is perfectly reliable, for
which we have more structural results and additional
insights. We conclude the study in section 5 with
some discussions on possible extensions and future
research. Finally, technical proofs and some numeri-
cal results are provided in the Appendix and the
online Appendix S1.
2. The Model
A firm sells a single product over a planning horizon
of T periods, indexed by t = 1, . . ., T. The firm has
two suppliers, referred to as supplier k, k = 1, 2. Both
suppliers face disruption risks in each period. When a
supplier is not disrupted in a period, we say it is reli-
able, and in this case any order placed to this supplier
will be fully delivered; if a supplier encounters a dis-
ruption in a period, however, then it will not be able
to process the order and nothing will be delivered.
Supplier 1 is a local/quick-response supplier; it can
deliver any order in its entirety in the same period the
order is placed (i.e., the lead time is zero) if there is no
disruption. Supplier 2, on the other hand, is a non-
local/regular supplier; it can deliver any order in its
entirety in the next period (i.e., the lead time is one) if
there is no disruption when it receives the order. This
lead time structure is for analytical tractability. Sup-
pose that the firm pays its suppliers for the delivered
product only, and the unit ordering cost from sup-
plier k is ck. Most of our results continue to hold when
the firm pays its suppliers partially for the ordered
product and partially for the delivered product. See
section 5 for more discussions on this.
We model the random disruption process of sup-
plier k by a dependent Bernoulli process as follows:
let Jt,k denote supplier k’s delivery capability in period
t, with Jt,k = 0 indicating that supplier k encounters a
disruption in period t and hence is unable to process
any order in period t, and Jt,k = 1 indicating that it is
capable of processing an order in period t. We assume
that {Jt,k, 0 ≤ t ≤ T} forms a Markov chain with tran-
sition probabilities
PfJt;k ¼ 1 j Jt1;k ¼ lg ¼ 1 PfJt;k ¼ 0 j Jt1;k ¼ lg
: ¼ ck;l; l ¼ 0; 1;
where “:=” represents “defined as”; the two pro-
cesses are independent of each other, which is due
to the lead time/geographical difference between
the two suppliers.
REMARK 1.
(a) Note that here Jt,k represents the internal dis-
ruption status of supplier k, not the order
delivery process. The order in period t for
supplier k is processed and shipped if sup-
plier k is not disrupted in period t, and as
long as the order is processed and shipped, it
will be delivered to the firm in period t for
supplier 1 and in period t + 1 for supplier 2.
(b) The disruption process (Jt,1, Jt,2) during period
t is random and is not known to the firm when
it places order at the beginning of period t.
However, after (Jt,1, Jt,2) is realized during per-
iod t, we assume that it becomes public infor-
mation and the firm would know (Jt,1, Jt,2) at
the beginning of period t+1 even if it did not
place any order in period t. When this assump-
tion is violated, then the firm would need to
make efforts to acquire this information. Note
that this is different from the case when a
firm’s reliability is observed by the firm upon
delivery. The reader is referred to Parlar et al.
(1995) for more discussions on this.
For notational convenience, it is assumed here the
transition probabilities are time-independent, but all
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results hold when they depend on time. We further
assume ck,0 ≤ ck,1 for k = 1, 2, which implies
fJtþs;k j Jt1;k ¼ 0g stfJtþs;k j Jt1;k ¼ 1g; for s 0:
ð1Þ
That is, fJtþs;k j Jt1;k ¼ lg is stochastically increasing
in l. For more discussions on stochastic ordering, see
Shaked and Shanthikumar (1994). Condition (1) sim-
ply means that supplier k will be more likely to be
reliable in the current and future periods if it was
reliable in the previous period than if it was dis-
rupted in the previous period.
The demand Dt in period t is a non-negative ran-
dom variable and it depends on the selling price p in
the period. We assume an additive demand model
with
Dt ¼ dtðpÞ þ t; t ¼ 1; . . .;T;
where 1,. . .,T are independent random variables
with mean zero, and are also independent of both
suppliers’ delivery capabilities. Thus, the suppliers’
delivery capabilities only impact demands through
the selling prices. The mean demand dt(p) is positive
and strictly decreasing in p 2 ½p
t
; pt, where pt and
pt are the lowest and highest possible unit prices to
be charged, respectively. This additive demand
model has been extensively discussed in the litera-
ture on joint optimization of pricing and inventory
replenishment (see, e.g., Chen and Simchi-Levi 2012,
Federgruen and Heching 1999, Feng 2010). Let pt(d)
be the inverse function of dt(p) over d 2 ½dt; dt,
where dt ¼ dtðptÞ  dt ¼ dtðptÞ. Thus, charging a
selling price p in period t is equivalent to choosing
the mean demand d = dt(p). In section 5, we will
provide some discussions for the case when the
demand model has a more general additive–multi-
plicative form.
At the end of each period, any unsold product is
carried to the next period with a holding cost; and
any unsatisfied demand is backlogged with a backlog
cost. Similar to Federgruen and Heching (1999), Chen
and Simchi-Levi (2004), and Li and Zheng (2006), we
assume that a customer pays the firm in the period
the demand occurs, even if the demand is backlogged;
any delay in delivery will be compensated with the
backlog cost. Under these assumptions, the expected
sales revenue of the firm in period t is Rt(d): = pt(d)d
when the mean demand d is chosen. We assume Rt(d)
is a concave function of d over ½dt; dt, which is a stan-
dard assumption in the literature (see, e.g., Federgru-
en and Heching 1999, Li and Zheng 2006).
The sequence of events in each period t is as fol-
lows: First, delivery from supplier 2 (if any, and that
supplier 2 was not disrupted in period t  1) arrives.
Second, the starting inventory level and two suppli-
ers’ delivery capabilities in period t  1 are reviewed.
Third, the firm decides the order quantity for each
supplier k, denoted as qk, k = 1, 2, and sets the selling
price p (or equivalently, the mean demand d). Fourth,
random delivery capabilities of the two suppliers in
period t, Jt,1, and Jt,2, are realized. Fifth, depending on
the realization of Jt,1 delivery from supplier 1 arrives
(if any) and the customer demand is realized. Finally,
the sales revenue and all costs for the period are cal-
culated. Suppose there is a one-period discount factor
a 2 (0, 1]. The firm’s objective is to find the optimal
joint pricing and inventory policies to maximize its
expected total discounted profit over the planning
horizon.
Let Gt(z) denote the expected holding and backlog
cost in period t when the inventory level after satisfy-
ing the mean demand is z. We assume that Gt(z) is
convex in z. Clearly, the convexity is satisfied if the
holding and backlog costs are linear in the ending
inventory, that is,
GtðzÞ ¼ hE½maxfz t; 0g þ bE½maxft  z; 0g;
where h is the unit holding cost, and b is the unit
backlog cost.
We define (x, i, j) as the “state” of the system at the
beginning of the period, where x is the starting inven-
tory level after receiving delivery from supplier 2 (if
any), and i and j are suppliers 1 and 2’s delivery capa-
bilities in the previous period, respectively. Let
Vt(x, i, j) denote the firm’s maximum expected total
discounted profit-to-go from period t, also known as
value function or optimal profit function, given the
system state is (x, i, j) at the beginning of period t.
Then, from standard stochastic dynamic program-
ming, we have, for t =1, . . ., T,
Vtðx; i; jÞ ¼ max
q1  0;q2  0
dt  d dt
n
RtðdÞ  c1c1;iq1  ac2c2;jq2
 c1;iGtðxþ q1  dÞ  ð1 c1;iÞGtðx dÞ
þ ac1;ic2;jE½Vtþ1ðxþ q1 þ q2  d t; 1; 1Þ
þ ð1 c2;jÞE½Vtþ1ðxþ q1  d t; 1; 0Þ

þ að1 c1;iÞc2;jE½Vtþ1ðxþ q2  d t; 0; 1Þ
þ ð1 c2;jÞE½Vtþ1ðx d t; 0; 0Þ
o
;
ð2Þ
and VT+1(x, i, j)  0. Note that on the right hand
side of Equation (2), the first term in the brackets is
the expected revenue; the second and third terms
are the expected ordering costs; the value of the next
two terms is the expected holding and backlog costs
in period t; and the remaining terms are the maxi-
mum expected total discounted profit-to-go from
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period t + 1, corresponding to different realizations
of the two suppliers’ delivery capabilities in
period t.
For 1 ≤ t ≤ T, let qt;1ðx; i; jÞ; qt;2ðx; i; jÞ; dt ðx; i; jÞ
 
denote the optimal solution of (q1, q2, d) of the maxi-
mization problem (2). That is, given state (x, i, j) at
the beginning of period t, qt;kðx; i; jÞ is the optimal
order quantity from supplier k and dt ðx; i; jÞ is the
optimal mean demand. Then, x þ qt;1ðx; i; jÞ and
x þ qt;1ðx; i; jÞ  dt ðx; i; jÞ are the optimal target
inventory level and the optimal target safety stock level,
respectively, when only supplier 1 is considered; sim-
ilarly, x þ qt;2ðx; i; jÞ and x þ qt;2ðx; i; jÞ  dt ðx; i; jÞ
are the optimal target inventory position and the opti-
mal target safety stock position, respectively, when only
supplier 2 is considered. Finally, we denote
pt ðx; i; jÞ ¼ ptðdt ðx; i; jÞÞ as the optimal selling price
in period t.
In the next section, we will first study the properties
of the value function in problem (2), and then charac-
terize the structure of the firm’s optimal pricing and
inventory policies.
3. Optimal Policies and Implications
We begin by examining the properties of the value
function in (2). The main technical approach used in
this study is lattice and modularity analysis. Some
preliminaries on lattice and modularity are provided
in the Appendix; and we refer the reader to Topkis
(1998) for more discussions. The following proposi-
tion establishes important properties of the value
function, which will facilitate our analysis on the opti-
mal policies. Below, unless otherwise specified, the
proofs will be given in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 1. For t = 1, . . ., T, Vt(x, i, j) is
increasing in i and j, concave in x, and submodular in
(x, i) and in (x, j).
Proposition 1 shows that the optimal expected
profit-to-go is larger if either one of the suppliers
was reliable in the previous period than if it was
disrupted in the previous period. In addition, the
submodularity results show that, the starting inven-
tory level in each period has a lower marginal value
if either one of the suppliers was reliable in the pre-
vious period than if it was disrupted. Finally, the
concavity of Vt(x, i, j) in x implies that the marginal
value of inventory decreases if the starting inventory
level increases.
With the above properties of the value function, we
can derive the structure of the firm’s optimal ordering
and pricing policies. The following theorem provides
a detailed characterization of the firm’s optimal
policies in each period.
THEOREM 1. For t = 1, . . ., T, suppose (x, i, j) is the
state of the system at the beginning of period t. Then, the
firm’s optimal policy is determined by critical numbers
ξt,k(i, j), k = 1, 2, such that the firm orders a positive
quantity from supplier k if and only if x < ξt,k(i, j); and
both the optimal order quantity qt;kðx; i; jÞ and optimal
selling price pt ðx; i; jÞ are decreasing in the starting
inventory level x, k = 1, 2. In addition, the optimal
policy parameters satisfy the following properties:
(a) dt ðx; i; jÞ, x  dt ðx; i; jÞ; and x þ qt;kðx; i; jÞ
 dt ðx; i; jÞ are increasing in x;
(b) pt ðx; 1; jÞ  pt ðx; 0; jÞ; and pt ðx; i; 1Þ  pt ðx; i; 0Þ;
(c) qt;1ðx; 1; jÞ  qt;1ðx; 0; jÞ and qt;2ðx; 1; jÞ  dt ðx; 1; jÞ
 qt;2ðx; 0; jÞ  dt ðx; 0; jÞ; and
(d) qt;2ðx; i; 1Þ qt;2ðx; i; 0Þ; and qt;1ðx; i; 1Þ  dt ðx; i; 1Þ
 qt;1ðx; i; 0Þ  dt ðx; i; 0Þ.
Theorem 1 states that the optimal ordering decision
from each supplier in a period is determined by a
reorder point (dependent on both suppliers’ delivery
capabilities in the previous period), above which the
firm orders nothing while below which the firm
orders a positive amount. In addition, part (a) shows
that, when only one supplier is considered, the opti-
mal target safety stock level/position for a period is
increasing in the starting inventory level in that per-
iod. Part (b) indicates that the optimal selling price in
a period is higher when either one of the suppliers
was disrupted in the previous period than when it
was reliable. Finally, parts (c) and (d) show that the
firm would order less from a supplier and keep a
higher target safety stock level/position from the
other supplier in one period when this supplier was
disrupted in the previous period than when it was
not. The result in the first part of (c) is intuitive, and
(d) is symmetric to (c), thus we only provide an expla-
nation for the second part of (c). When one supplier
was disrupted in period t  1, to cope with this situa-
tion, besides increasing the selling price/lowering
customer demand, the firm can also choose to order
more from the other supplier. Since ordering more
from the other supplier and lowering customer
demand are two competing forces to deal with dis-
ruption, under our additive demand model it is opti-
mal for the firm to keep a higher level of the optimal
order quantity from the other supplier net of the mean
demand. Note that if the price is exogenously given in
period t, then the firm should always order more from
the other supplier when one supplier was disrupted
in period t  1, since it is the only way to deal with
disruption. However, this result may not be true if the
price is an endogenous decision, since raising the sell-
ing price alone can be sufficient to cope with disrup-
tion in this case.
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We next study the impacts of unit ordering costs on
the firm’s optimal profit and the optimal policies,
which will reveal some important insights on the
impact of dual sourcing. To highlight the dependence
on ck, we rewrite Vt(x, i, j) as Vtðx; i; j j ckÞ. Similar
notation will be used for the optimal policies and con-
trol parameters, whenever needed. Our main results
are summarized in the following theorem.
THEOREM 2. For t = 1, . . ., T and k = 1, 2, we have,
(a) Vtðx; i; j j ckÞ is decreasing in ck and supermodular
in (x, ck), while Vtðx; i; j j ckÞ  ckx is submodular
in (x, ck); and
(b) qt;kðx; i; j j ckÞ, dt ðx; i; j j ckÞ, and nt;kði; j j ckÞ are
decreasing in ck; while p

t ðx; i; j j ckÞ and
qt;k0 ðx; i; j j ckÞ  dt ðx; i; j j ckÞ are increasing in ck,
where k0 = 3  k.
The monotonicity of the value function Vt in ck is
rather obvious. The supermodularity and submodu-
larity results in (a) imply that the marginal value of
inventory is increasing in ck but by a magnitude less
than the increment of ck. Theorem 2(b) shows that
when the unit ordering cost from one supplier
increases, the firm will order less from this supplier,
and keep a higher target safety stock level/position
for the other supplier; and in the meanwhile, it will
charge a higher selling price and hence set a lower
mean demand. As a special case, if the selling price is
not a decision in period t, then the firm will always
order more from the other supplier if one supplier
increases its unit ordering cost. This result, however,
is not always true when the selling price is a decision.
The intuitions here are very similar to the ones given
above for the case when one supplier was disrupted.
In the next section, we will provide a numerical exam-
ple to demonstrate this point.
An important issue we want to study is the impacts
of dual sourcing, that is, for a firm which originally has
only one supplier, what are the impacts of introduc-
ing a second supplier? Previous research in this area
has focused on the impact of dual sourcing on the
firm’s profit, and here we further explore its impacts
on the firm’s operational policies, on its customers,
and on its suppliers. This can be achieved by applying
Theorem 2, since as ck becomes large enough, supplier
k will never be used hence the dual-sourcing system
would be reduced to a system with a single supplier
k0, where k0 = 3  k. Therefore, Theorem 2 enables us
to compare a single-sourcing system with a dual-
sourcing system, and identify the impacts of introduc-
ing a second supplier. Specifically, applying Theorem
2 we conclude that introducing a second supplier
leads to a higher expected profit and a lower selling
price; hence introducing another supplier benefits not
only the firm but also its customers. For the incumbent
supplier in the single-sourcing system, if the selling
price is exogenously given, then it will always receive
less orders after the firm introduces the second sup-
plier. However, this result is not always true when
the price is an endogenous decision. We will discuss
more on this issue in the next section.
Finally, we are interested in understanding the
impacts of the reliability of the suppliers. It is straight-
forward to show, by mathematical induction, that as
either one of the two suppliers becomes more reliable
(i.e., transition probabilities ck,l, k =,1, 2, l = 0, 1,
increase), the firm’s optimal profit function goes up;
hence a more reliable supplier is always desired by
the firm. However, the impacts of supply reliability
on the operational policies are much more compli-
cated. Thus, we mainly study this issue in the next
section, where a special case of our general model is
considered.
4. One Reliable and One Unreliable
Supplier
In this section, we focus on the special case where
supplier 1 is perfectly reliable and can always deliver
the firm’s order within the period the order is placed,
that is, c1,l = 1 for l = 1, 2; and only supplier 2 may
suffer random disruption, but it is less costly, that is,
c1 > c2 > 0. (Note that otherwise, supplier 2 will never
be utilized.) This could be the case if supplier 1 repre-
sents in-house production or a local/domestic reliable
supplier, while supplier 2 represents a non-local/
outsourcing supplier. Obviously, all conclusions
obtained in the previous section remain valid. We will
show below that for this special case the optimal pol-
icy has a simpler structure, and more importantly,
additional insights can be drawn.
Since supplier 2 is the only supplier which may suf-
fer random disruption, for simplicity we write Jt,2 and
c2,j, respectively, as Jt and c
j in this section. Besides,
the state of the system is now reduced to (x, j), where
x is the starting inventory level after receiving deliv-
ery from supplier 2 (if any), and j is the delivery capa-
bility of supplier 2 in the previous period.
Accordingly, the value function Vt(x, i, j) can be sim-
plified as Vt(x, j), and the optimality equation (2) can
be rewritten as, for t = 1, . . ., T,
Vtðx; jÞ ¼ max
y2  y1  x
dt  d dt

RtðdÞ  c1ðy1  xÞ  Gtðy1  dÞ
þ ð1 cjÞaE½Vtþ1ðy1  d t; 0Þ þ cj ac2ðy2  y1Þ þ aE½Vtþ1ðy2  d t; 1Þ;
ð3Þ
and VT+1(x, j) = 0. Here y1 = x + q1 is the inventory
level after ordering from supplier 1, while
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y2 = y1 + q2 is the target inventory position after order-
ing from both suppliers.
For 1 ≤ t ≤ T, let yt;1ðx; jÞ; yt;2ðx; jÞ; dt ðx; jÞ
 
denote
the optimal solution of (y1,y2,d) of the maximization
problem (3). That is, yt;1ðx; jÞ (respectively, yt;2ðx; jÞ) is
the optimal inventory level after ordering from sup-
plier 1 (respectively, target inventory position after
ordering from both suppliers), and dt ðx; jÞ is the opti-
mal mean demand. Then, yt;1ðx; jÞ  dt ðx; jÞ and
yt;2ðx; jÞ  dt ðx; jÞ are the optimal safety stock level for
supplier 1 and the optimal target safety stock position for
supplier 2, respectively. Note that in the previous sec-
tion yt;1ðx; jÞ  dt ðx; jÞ is referred to as the optimal
target safety stock level for supplier 1, since in there,
the order quantity qt;1ðx; jÞ may not be delivered,
hence the safety stock level may or may not be
reached. In addition, denote qt;kðx; jÞ and pt ðx; jÞ as
the optimal order quantity from supplier k and the
optimal selling price, respectively, k = 1, 2.
For convenience we define
ftðz; jÞ ¼ ac2zþ aE½Vtþ1ðz t; jÞ; ð4Þ
gtðz; jÞ ¼ ðc1  ac2Þz GtðzÞ
þmax
z z
cjftðz; 1Þ þ ð1 cjÞftðz; 0Þ
  ð5Þ
for t = 1,. . ., T. Then, the optimality equation (3) can
be further simplified to
Vtðx; jÞ ¼ max
y1  x
dt  d dt
RtðdÞ þ c1ðx dÞ þ gtðy1  d; jÞf g:
ð6Þ
As a corollary of Proposition 1, Vt(x, j) is increasing
in j, concave in x, and submodular in (x, j). Since Gt()
is a convex function, it follows from Equations (4) and
(5) that both ft(z, j) and gt(z, j) are increasing in j, con-
cave in z, and submodular in (z, j). For t = 1, . . ., T
and j = 0, 1, denote zt;1ðjÞ and zt;2 as the maximizers
of gt(z, j) and ft(z, 1), respectively. That is,
zt;1ðjÞ ¼ argmaxz gtðz; jÞ; and z

t;2 ¼ argmaxz ftðz; 1Þ:
In case that ft(z, 1) (respectively, gt(z, j)) is monotoni-
cally decreasing in z, we define zt;2 ¼ 1 (respec-
tively, zt;1ðjÞ ¼ 1). Since gt(z, j) is submodular in
(z, j), we have zt;1ð1Þ  zt;1ð0Þ. It will be seen later that
zt;1ðjÞ is the optimal safety stock level for ordering from
supplier 1 while zt;2 is the optimal target safety stock posi-
tion for ordering from supplier 2. We further define
d^t ¼ arg max
dt  d dt
RtðdÞ  c1df g:
With the preceding notation, the following theorem
provides a detailed characterization of the firm’s opti-
mal ordering and pricing policies in each period. In
particular, the ordering policies from both suppliers
are of a base-stock type, and the optimal pricing pol-
icy is a list-price policy with markdowns, which are
much simpler than the optimal policies for the general
model with two unreliable suppliers.
THEOREM 3. For t = 1, . . ., T, suppose (x, j) is the state
of the system at the beginning of period t.
(a) The optimal ordering policy from supplier 1 is a
base-stock policy with base-stock level d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ,
that is,
yt;1ðx; jÞ ¼ maxfd^t þ zt;1ðjÞ; xg: ð7Þ
(b) The optimal ordering policy from supplier 2 is of a
base-stock type with constant target safety stock
position zt;2, that is,
yt;2ðx; jÞ ¼ maxfyt;1ðx; jÞ; dt ðx; jÞ þ zt;2g; ð8Þ
where yt;1ðx; jÞ is given by (7), and dt ðx; jÞ and
x  dt ðx; jÞ are both increasing in x. Thus, an order
from supplier 2 is placed only when the inventory level
after ordering from supplier 1 is below the base-stock
level dt ðx; jÞ þ zt;2. In particular, when zt;1ðjÞ  zt;2,
then yt;2ðx; jÞ ¼ yt;1ðx; jÞ and it is optimal not to order
from supplier 2.
(c) The optimal pricing policy is a list-price policy
with markdowns: if x  d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ, then
dt ðx; jÞ ¼ d^t, and a list price pt ðx; jÞ ¼ ptðd^tÞ is
optimal; if x [ d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ, then pt ðx; jÞ is a
decreasing function of both x and j, with
pt ðx; jÞ ptðd^tÞ:
Therefore, the optimal policies for the system with
a perfectly reliable quick supplier are much simpler
and possess most of the nice properties of single-
sourcing inventory models. From Theorem 3(b),
x  dt ðx; jÞ is increasing in x and it is less than or
equal to yt;2ðx; jÞ  dt ðx; jÞ. Thus, there exists a criti-
cal number, such that it is optimal to order nothing
from supplier 2 when the starting inventory level in
period t exceeds this critical number. It is interesting
to note that when supplier 1 is perfectly reliable, it
always receives more orders from the firm when sup-
plier 2 was disrupted in the previous period than
when it was not, regardless of whether the selling
price is an endogenous decision. This result directly
follows from Theorem 3(a) and the aforementioned
inequality zt;1ð1Þ  zt;1ð0Þ; however, this result is not
true when supplier 1 is not perfectly reliable, as we
discussed in the previous section.
We next analyze the impacts of unit ordering costs
on the optimal policies. In addition to all the results in
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Theorem 2, we have the following results when sup-
plier 1 is perfectly reliable.
PROPOSITION 2. For t = 1, . . ., T, zt;1ðj j c1; c2Þ is
decreasing in c1 and increasing in c2; z

t;2ðc1; c2Þ
is increasing in c1 and decreasing in c2; and q

t;1ðx; jj c2Þ
is increasing in c2.
Proposition 2 presents some comparative statics
results for the safety stock level for supplier 1, zt;1ðjÞ,
and the target safety stock position for supplier 2, zt;2,
with respect to the unit ordering costs. Also, it is seen
that the firm will order more from supplier 1 when c2
increases. In contrast, when c1 increases, Theorem 2
shows that qt;2ðx; j j c1Þ  dt ðx; j j c1Þ will increase but
it does not specify the effect on the optimal order
quantity from supplier 2. When the selling price in
period t is exogenously given, we can infer from the
above result that the firm will order more from sup-
plier 2. This result, however, is not true when price is
also a decision, as demonstrated in the following
numerical example.
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose T = 3, a = 0.97, h = 1, b = 8,
dt(p) = 100  10p, et	Uniform[20, 20], pt ¼ 0,
pt ¼ 8, c2 = 3, c0 = 0.3, and c1 = 0.9. The optimal
order quantity from supplier 2 in period 1 when j = 0
as a function of c1 and x is shown in Figure 1. As we
can see from this figure, it is clear that the optimal
order quantity from supplier 2 is not monotone in c1.
Proposition 2 is a powerful result and it allows us
to study the operational effect of sourcing diversifica-
tion. This is because, by letting c1 or c2 go to infinity,
the dual-sourcing problem is reduced to a single-
sourcing problem, and the monotonicity result in The-
orem 2 and Proposition 2 would enable us to analyze
the impact of introducing a second supplier on the
incumbent supplier. Applying these arguments we
conclude that supplier 1 always receives less orders
after the firm introduces the second supplier, regard-
less of whether the selling price is a decision or not;
and if the price is exogenously given, supplier 2 also
always receives less orders after the firm introduces
supplier 1. However, if the price is a decision, then
supplier 2 might receive more orders from the firm
after supplier 1 is added into the system. This can be
seen from the previous numerical example, say with
x = 45, by comparing the optimal order quantity from
supplier 2 for a given c1 (say c1 = 5) with that for a
large enough value of c1, which corresponds to
another system with only supplier 2. The intuition
behind this is the following: Adding supplier 1 to the
system induces two competing forces that may
change the optimal order quantity from supplier 2.
On the one hand, it tends to lower the order quantity
from supplier 2 due to the newly added supplier 1; on
the other hand, it will also lower the optimal price
thus attract more demand, giving the firm an incen-
tive to order more from supplier 2. When the latter
force exceeds the former, the firm will order more
from supplier 2.
REMARK 2. Following Theorem 2, Proposition 2, and
the above discussion, it is interesting to observe that
when the selling price of the firm is exogenously
given (e.g., the market price), the supplier will
receive less orders after the firm introduces a second
supplier; but this result is not always true if the sell-
ing price is also a decision. Thus, the impact of the
firm’s pricing decision on its suppliers can be subtle.
We now proceed to study the impacts of supplier
2’s reliability, measured by c0 and c1 (noting that a lar-
ger cl, l = 0,1, represents a more reliable supplier 2),
on the firm’s optimal profit functions and operational
policies. Since the firm never orders from supplier 2
in period T because of its one-period lead time, nei-
ther the optimal profit functions nor the optimal poli-
cies in period T depend on cl. For t = 1, . . ., T1, we
expand the arguments of the optimal profit functions,
the optimal policies, and other control parameters to
include cl, whenever needed, as we did previously on
the unit ordering costs. The following theorem sum-
marizes our main results. Among other results, the
theorem states that a more reliable supplier is beneficial to
both the firm and its customers.
THEOREM 4. For t = 1, . . ., T  1 and l = 0, 1, we
have
(a) Vtðx; j j clÞ is increasing in cl and submodular in
(x, cl);
(b) zt;1ðj j clÞ and zt;2ðclÞ are decreasing in cl, and
zT1;2ðclÞ is independent of cl; and
(c) pt ðx; j j clÞ, qt;1ðx; j j clÞ, and the optimal target
safety stock position yt;2ðx; j j clÞ  dt ðx; j j clÞ are
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decreasing in cl, while dt ðx; j j clÞ and qT1;2
ðx; j j clÞ are increasing in cl.
Theorem 4(a) shows that the firm’s optimal profit
function in each period t increases while the marginal
value of inventory decreases when supplier 2
becomes more reliable. It is noteworthy that the sub-
modularity of the value function on (x, cl) plays a key
role in analyzing the impact of supplier 2’s reliability
on the optimal policies. Part (b) shows that the safety
stock level for supplier 1 and the target safety stock
position for supplier 2 are both decreasing in cl,
implying that when supplier 2 becomes more reliable,
the firm would maintain less safety stocks from both
suppliers in managing its inventory. In particular,
since supplier 2 is not used in period T, it is clear from
its definition that zT1;2ðclÞ does not depend on cl.
Part (c) shows that the optimal selling price, the
optimal order quantity from supplier 1, and the opti-
mal target safety stock for ordering from supplier 2
are all decreasing in cl, which further implies that the
optimal mean demand is increasing in cl. This is
because, when supplier 2 becomes more reliable, the
firm is more certain of the delivery of its order hence
it will be more economical to order when needed
(rather than order more to prepare for future delivery
uncertainty).
When the selling price is exogenously given, Theo-
rem 4(c) also implies that the optimal total order quan-
tity in period t, which is
qt;1ðx; j j clÞ þ qt;2ðx; j j clÞ ¼ yt;2ðx; jjclÞ  x
is decreasing in cl. When the selling price is a deci-
sion, however, numerical examples can be easily
constructed to show that the optimal total order
quantity is not monotone in cl. Finally, Theorem 4(c)
states that the optimal order quantity from supplier
2 is increasing in cl when t = T  1. This result,
however, again cannot be extended to an arbitrary
period t, as seen in the following example.
EXAMPLE 2. Suppose T = 4, c1 = 5, c2 = 3, c
0 = 0.3,
and other parameters except c1 are the same as
those in Example 1. The optimal order quantity
from supplier 2 in period 1 when j = 1 is shown in
Figure 2. As can be seen from this figure, the opti-
mal order quantity from supplier 2 can decrease
when c1 becomes larger.
The underlying intuitions for this phenomenon are
as follows. For a period t with t < T  1, the firm
needs to consider multiple future demands when
ordering from supplier 2. When cl is small, the firm
probably has to order multiple times until it finally
receives an order, which in turn provides the firm
with an incentive to place a large order. In contrast,
when cl is large, the firm is quite likely to receive its
order after it is placed, thus a small order may be
more economical. Therefore, the optimal order quan-
tity from supplier 2 may decrease as cl increases.
REMARK 3. The above discussions present another
impact of the firm’s pricing decision on the suppliers:
when the selling price is exogenously given, the opti-
mal total order quantity decreases when supplier 2
becomes more reliable; however, this result is not
always true when the price is an endogenous deci-
sion. Note that the impact here is on the optimal total
order quantity rather than the optimal order quantity
from supplier 2. Thus, regardless of whether the price
is a decision or not, supplier 2 may receive less orders
when it becomes more reliable.
Having discussed the impact of reliability of the
regular supplier (supplier 2), it is natural to ask a sim-
ilar question about the quick-response supplier (sup-
plier 1). As we pointed out at the end of section 3,
although it is straightforward to show that a more
reliable supplier is always desired by the firm, the
impact of supply reliability on the operational policies
is more complicated when both suppliers are unreli-
able. However, we are able to characterize how the
optimal policies change when supplier 1 improves
from being unreliable to perfectly reliable. That is, we
can compare the general model with both suppliers
being unreliable, the one we discussed in the previous
sections, with the model studied in this section. The
following theorem summarizes our comparison
results. We abuse the notations slightly by letting
Vt(x, i, j), p

t ðx; i; jÞ, and dt ðx; i; jÞ denote our quanti-
ties of interest for the model with two unreliable sup-
pliers, while letting Vt(x, j), p

t ðx; jÞ, and dt ðx; jÞ
denote the corresponding quantities for the model
with supplier 1 being perfectly reliable.
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THEOREM 5. For t = 1, . . ., T, we have
(a) Vt(x, i, j) ≤ Vt(x, j) and Vt(x, i, j)  Vt(x, j) is
increasing in x; and
(b) pt ðx; i; jÞ  pt ðx; jÞ and dt ðx; i; jÞ  dt ðx; jÞ.
Theorem 5(a) shows that the firm can obtain a
higher optimal expected total discounted profit when
supplier 1 becomes perfectly reliable from being un-
reliable, but the incremental benefit is monotonically
decreasing in the starting inventory level. That the
firm prefers a reliable supplier is obvious; and the
result of a diminishing effect of the starting inventory
level also appears to be appealing, since the incremen-
tal value of sourcing from a perfectly reliable supplier
(rather than an unreliable supplier) should become
less when the firm has more on-hand inventory. Part
(b) states that as supplier 1 becomes perfectly reliable,
the firm will charge a lower optimal selling price and
hence set a higher optimal mean demand; thus, a
reliable supplier also benefits the customers. Hence,
these results again support our general claim that, a
more reliable supplier benefits both the firm and its
customers.
Theorem 5 does not compare the optimal order
quantities between the two models. In fact, as
demonstrated in the following numerical example,
the optimal order quantity from each supplier in one
model is not always dominated by that in the other
model.
EXAMPLE 3. Suppose T = 4, c1 = 5, c2 = 3, and the
transition probabilities for supplier 2 are c0 = 0.3,
and c1 = 0.8 (or, using the notation from Section 2,
c2,0 = 0.3, and c2,1 = 0.8). In addition, suppose sup-
plier 1 in model 1 is unreliable with c1,0 = 0.5 and
c1,1 = 0.8, while it is perfectly reliable in model 2.
Other parameters are the same as those in Example
1. The comparison between the two models of the
optimal ordering policies in period 1 when
(i, j) = (1, 0) is shown in Figure 3. As we can see
from this figure, when supplier 1 improves from
being unreliable to perfectly reliable, the optimal
order quantity from each supplier may be higher or
lower, depending on the starting inventory level.
Hence, we observe again that a supplier does not
always receive more orders from improving its reli-
ability. Another observation from our numerical
studies is that the reorder point for ordering from
supplier 1 is always higher in model 1. The intuition
is that, when supplier 1 is unreliable, placing multi-
ple rather than a single order can provide diversifi-
cation over time and reduce the chance of stockout,
which implies that it may be optimal to order from
supplier 1 in the current period to satisfy future
demands in model 1, while it is not optimal to do
so in model 2. Thus, the reorder point for ordering
from supplier 1 is higher in model 1.
We conclude this section with a numerical example
to demonstrate how dynamic pricing and dual sourc-
ing impact the system performance.
EXAMPLE 4. Suppose supplier 1 is perfectly reliable,
T = 5, c1 = 0.9, c1 = 5, and (x, j) = (0, 0). Other
parameters are the same as those in Example 1. Fig-
ure 4 displays, for different values of c2 and c
0, the
percentages of increase in the firm’s profit after sup-
plier 2 is introduced to a system which originally
has supplier 1 only, assuming the optimal static
price (for the given initial state) is used; while Fig-
ure 5 shows the percentages of increase in the firm’s
profit when we further use the optimal dynamic
pricing policy in the dual-sourcing system.
From Figures 4 and 5, we can see that supply source
diversification can improve the firm’s profit very sig-
nificantly when the selling price is fixed; and the per-
formance can be further improved by using a
dynamic pricing policy, but with a less significant
magnitude.
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5. Conclusion and Discussions
In this study, we study a joint pricing and inventory
control problem for a firm that sources from two sup-
pliers, both facing disruption risks. The two suppliers
can deliver any order in the same period and in the
next period in which the order is placed, respectively,
if there is no disruption; but nothing is delivered if
disruption occurs. The random disruption processes
of the two suppliers are modeled as independent
Markov chains. We characterize the firm’s optimal
pricing and inventory policies over a planning hori-
zon, and identify the impacts of dual sourcing and
supply reliability on the firm, on its customers, and
on its suppliers. We show that the optimal inventory
policy is a reorder point policy, and the optimal price
in each period is a decreasing function of the starting
inventory level in that period; and for the special case
where the quick-response supplier is perfectly reli-
able, the optimal inventory policy is of a base-stock
type and the optimal pricing policy is a list-price pol-
icy with markdowns. In addition, we show that both
the firm and its customers benefit from dual sourcing
and higher supply reliability. For suppliers, we show
that if the selling price is exogenously given, then one
supplier always receives more orders when the other
one was disrupted than when it was not and it always
receives less orders after the firm introduces a second
supplier; however and interestingly, neither result is
true if the price is an endogenous decision. We also
find that a supplier does not always receive more
orders when it has higher supply reliability.
Our model can be extended along several direc-
tions. First, we can show that, if the demands in dif-
ferent periods are independent and identically
distributed, and all parameters are stationary over
time, then there exist stationary optimal policies for
the infinite horizon problem, and all results in this paper
remain valid. Second, all of our results except those
on the impacts of suppliers’ reliability can be
extended to the case where the disruption processes
of the two suppliers are dependent, as long as the
two-dimensional Markov chain describing the supply
disruptions are stochastically increasing. Third, we
assume in this paper that the firm pays for the deliv-
ered product only. This could be easily relaxed by
assuming that the firm pays partially for the ordered
product and partially for the delivered product, as in
Federgruen and Yang (2011). Suppose, in addition to
ck, the cost for each unit delivered from supplier k,
k = 1, 2, the firm also pays ck’ for each unit ordered
from supplier k. Note that our model is the special
case here with c0k  0. Then we will need to include a
linear term ðc01q1  c02q2Þ to the objective function on
the right hand side of optimality equation (2). For this
case, all of the results in this paper except Theorem 4
can be similarly obtained.
We end this paper with discussions on several
other possible extensions of our model.
5.1. Suppliers with Random Yield
In this study, the suppliers are assumed to face dis-
ruption risks. Given random disruption can be
viewed as a special case of random yield with a
Bernoulli distribution, it is interesting to consider a
similar problem for the case in which the suppliers
face general random yield. As mentioned in section 1,
Chen et al. (2013) characterize the structure of the
optimal policies for this problem, and show that the
optimal inventory policy for each supplier is a near
reorder point policy and the optimal price may not be
monotone in the starting inventory level. They do not
study the impacts of dual sourcing and supply reli-
ability. For the former, it is easy to show that dual
sourcing always benefits the firm; but due to the com-
plexity of the problem we are not able to show that it
also always benefits the customers. For the latter, if
the supplier’s reliability is measured according to
“convex order” of the random yield, then we can show
that the firm always benefits from higher supply reli-
ability; but if it is measured using “stochastic order,”
then examples can be constructed to show that the
firm may not benefit from higher supply reliability.
Therefore, we claim that most of our results in this
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paper are for inventory models with multiple sourcing
and disruption risks, and not for multiple sourcing
with general random yields. (Indeed, it is known that,
even for the simplest inventory models, general ran-
dom yield can lead to very counter-intuitive results,
see Gupta and Cooper (2005) on a single-period
single-supplier inventory model with random yield).
5.2. Additive–Multiplicative Demand Models
In this study, the demand model is assumed to have
an additive form. When the demand model takes a
more general additive–multiplicative form (i.e.,
Dt = wtdt(p) + et, where wt and et are both random
variables), following similar analysis to Chen et al.
(2013), we can show that the optimal inventory policy
is a near reorder point policy for each supplier. In
addition, we can prove that the optimal price
decreases in the starting inventory level when sup-
plier 1 is perfectly reliable. When supplier 1 is unreli-
able, we are not able to prove this result theoretically;
therefore, we conducted a numerical study; we found
that this monotonicity result is true under all the
numerical examples we tested. We also conducted
several numerical examples to examine the impacts of
dual sourcing and supply reliability. In these exam-
ples, wt takes discrete distributions with mean 1, et is
uniformly distributed on [a, a] for some choices of a;
and d(p) is linear in p. The holding cost h is normal-
ized to 1; and several combinations of c1 2 {5, 8},
c2 2 {1, 3, 6}, and b 2 {8, 12} are tested. From
these numerical examples, we observe that introduc-
ing another supplier and higher supply reliability are
both beneficial to the firm and its customers. In addi-
tion, if the selling price is a decision, then the incum-
bent supplier may receive more orders after the firm
introduces a second supplier; and the supplier may or
may not receive more orders when it becomes more
reliable, but it always receives fewer orders when the
other supplier becomes more reliable. These results
are consistent with our results for the additive
demand model. See the online Appendix for an illus-
tration of these numerical results.
5.3. General Lead Times
We assume for simplicity that the lead times of the
two suppliers are 0 and 1, respectively. It would be
more practical to consider the more general model
with the lead times being 0 and k, respectively. For
this general model, the state space needs to be
expanded to include pipeline inventories, resulting in
a stochastic dynamic program with k + 2 dimensions.
Pang et al. (2012) study a special case of this model
with a single perfectly reliable supplier of k periods of
lead times, and show that both the optimal order
quantity and the optimal price decrease in the on-
hand and pipeline inventories. For the general model
with two suppliers facing disruption risks, by using
similar analysis to that in Pang et al. (2012), we can
show that (a) the optimal price decreases in the on-
hand inventory, and (b) the optimal order quantity
from each supplier decreases in the on-hand and
pipeline inventories when either supplier 1 is per-
fectly reliable or there is no pricing decision. How-
ever, due to the complex nature of the problem, we
find it very challenging to analyze the impacts of dual
sourcing and supply reliability. We expect that new
techniques have to be developed to analyze these
issues under general settings, thus we leave them for
future research.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we provide the proofs of Proposition
1 and Theorems 1, 3, and 4. We leave the proofs of the
other results in the Appendix S1. Also in the Appen-
dix S1 we will use numerical examples to investigate
the additive–multiplicative demand models.
First, some preliminaries are needed. A partially
ordered set X is called a lattice if it contains the mini-
mum and maximum of each pairs of its elements; X’
is called a sublattice of X if it is a subset of X and con-
tains the minimum and maximum (with respect to X)
of each pair of the elements of X’. Let V ⊂ ℜn be a lat-
tice and ℜ the set of real numbers. A function f:
V ? ℜ is called supermodular if
fðxÞ þ fðyÞ fðx ^ yÞ þ fðx _ yÞ
for any x, y 2 V, where ^ and ∨ are the compo-
nent-wise minimum and maximum operators,
respectively. A function f is submodular if f is su-
permodular. For more details on these concepts we
refer the reader to Topkis (1998). The following
result is from Theorem 2.7.6 and Theorem 2.8.2 in
Topkis (1998), which will be frequently used in
deriving our theoretical results.
LEMMA 1. If X and Y are lattices, S is a sublattice of
X 9 Y, f(x, y) is supermodular in (x, y) on S, Sx is the
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section of S at x in X, and gðxÞ ¼ maxy2 Sx fðx; yÞ is
finite, then g(x) is supermodular. In addition, define
yðxÞ ¼ argmaxy2Sx fðx; yÞ, then y*(x) is increasing in x.
In what follows, we first present two lemmas,
which will play important roles in the proofs for
Theorems 4 and 5 respectively; and they may be of
independent interest; their proofs are given in the
Appendix S1.
LEMMA 2. Suppose /i(x, h): ℜ 9 [0, 1] ? ℜ is sub-
modular in (x, h), i = 1, 2; /1(x, h) is concave in x; and
/1(x, h)  /2(x, h) is decreasing in x, then
wðx; hÞ :¼ max
y x
h/1ðy; hÞ þ ð1 hÞ/2ðx; hÞf g
is also submodular in (x, h).
LEMMA 3. Suppose /1(x, q): ℜ 9 ℜ
+ ? ℜ is concave
and submodular in (x, q) and /2(x):ℜ ? ℜ is concave
in x. In addition, suppose maxðx;qÞ 2<
<þ /1ðx; qÞ ¼
maxx2< /1ðx; 0Þ and /1(x, 0)  /2(x) is increasing in
x. Then,
wðxÞ :¼ max
q 0
/1ðx; qÞ max
q 0
/2ðxþ qÞ
is also increasing in x.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. We prove the proposition
by induction on t. Since VT+1(x, i, j) = 0, the propo-
sition is obviously true for t = T + 1. Now we
assume inductively that the proposition holds for
period t + 1. In what follows, we shall prove that
it also holds for period t and then complete the
proof.
We first prove Vt(x, i, j) is concave in x. Since Rt()
and Gt() are both concave functions and
Vt+1(x, i, j) is concave in x by the inductive assump-
tion, it is easy to verify that the maximand in Equa-
tion (2) is concave in (x, q1, q2, d). Since the
constraint in Equation (2) is a convex set, it follows
from Proposition B-4 of Heyman and Sobel (1984)
that Vt(x, i, j) is concave in x.
We next prove the remaining results for Vt(x, i, j).
In what follows, we only prove Vt(x, i, j) is increas-
ing in i and submodular in (x, i); and a similar
approach can prove that it is increasing in j and
submodular in (x, j).
For convenience, we define
Ltðx; i; jÞ ¼ ac2xþ aEVtþ1ðx t; i; jÞ; ðA1Þ
Wtðx; y; i; jÞ ¼  ðc1  ac2Þx GtðxÞ þ c2;jLtðy; i; 1Þ
þ ð1 c2;jÞLtðx; i; 0Þ;
ðA2Þ
Htðx; y; i; jÞ ¼max
q1  0

c1;iWtðxþ q1; yþ q1; 1; jÞ
þ ð1 c1;iÞWtðx; y; 0; jÞ

:
ðA3Þ
Then, the optimality equation (2) can be rewritten as
Vtðx; i; jÞ ¼ max
q2  0
dt  d dt

RtðdÞ þ c1ðx dÞ þHtðx d; x
þ q2  d; i; jÞ

: ðA4Þ
Since Vt+1(x, 1, j) ≥ Vt+1(x, 0, j), it follows from
Equations (A1) and (A2) that
max
q10
Wtðxþ q1;yþ q1;1; jÞf gWtðx;y;1; jÞWtðx;y;0; jÞ:
Since c1,1 ≥ c1,0, it follows from Equation (A3) that
Ht(x, y, 1, j) ≥ Ht(x, y, 0, j). Therefore, it follows
from Equation (A4) that Vt(x, 1, j) ≥ Vt(x, 0, j).
In what follows, we prove Vt(x, i, j) is submodular
in (x, i). To this end, we need to first prove that
Ht(x, y, i, j) is supermodular in (x, y) and submodu-
lar in (x, i) and in (y, i).
Since Gt(x) and Vt+1(x, i, j) are both concave in x,
it follows from Equation (A1) that Lt(x, i, j) is con-
cave in x and then from Equation (A2) that
Wt(x  q0, y  q0, 1, j) is supermodular in (x, y, q0).
Thus, by applying Lemma 1, maxq1  0 Wtðxf
þ q1; y þ q1; 1; jÞg ¼ maxq0  0 Wtðx q; y q; 1; jÞg
is supermodular in (x, y). In addition, since 0 ≤ c1,i
≤ 1 and Wt(x, y, 0, j) is supermodular in (x, y) from
(A2), it follows from Equation (A3) that Ht(x, y, i, j)
is supermodular in (x, y).
Now we prove Ht(x, y, i, j) is submodular in (x, i)
and in (y, i). Since Vt+1(x, i, j) is submodular in
(x, i), it directly follows from Equations (A1) and
(A2) that Wt(x, y, i, j) is submodular in (x, i) and in
(y, i). Thus, Wt(x, y, 1, j)  Wt(x, y, 0, j) is decreas-
ing in x and y. For any given q1 ≥ 0, since Lt(x, i, j)
is concave in x and by Equation (A2),
Wt(x + q1, y + q1, 1, j)  Wt(x, y, 1, j) is decreasing
in x and y. Thus, maxq1  0 Wtðxþ q1; yþf
q1; 1; jÞ Wtðx; y; 0; jÞg is also decreasing in x and
y. From Equation (A3), we have
Htðx; y; 1; jÞ Htðx; y; 0; jÞ ¼ ðc1;1  c1;0Þmax
q1  0
Wtðxþ q1; yþ q1; 1; jÞ Wtðx; y; 0; jÞ

:
ðA5Þ
Since c1,1 ≥ c1,0, it follows from Equation (A5) that
Ht(x, y, 1, j)  Ht(x, y, 0, j) is decreasing in x and y.
Thus, Ht(x, y, i, j) is submodular in (x, i) and in
(y, i).
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We are now ready to prove Vt(x, i, j) is submodu-
lar in (x, i). By replacing d and q2 with ~d ¼ x  d
and ~q2 ¼ x þ q2  d, Equation (A4) can be rewrit-
ten as
Vtðx;i; jÞ ¼ max
~q2~d
dtx~ddt
Rtðx ~dÞþ c1~dþHtð~d;~q2;i; jÞ
n o
:
ðA6Þ
Since Htð~d; ~q2; i; jÞ is supermodular in ð~d; ~q2; iÞ
and Rtðx  ~dÞ is supermodular in ðx; ~dÞ due to the
concavity of Rt(), the maximand in Equation (A6) is
a supermodular function in ðx; ~d; ~q2; iÞ. In addition,
one can easily verify that the constraint in Equation
(A6) is a lattice. Thus, by applying Lemma 1,
Vt(x, i, j) is supermodular in (x, i) so Vt(x, i, j) is
submodular in (x, i). h
PROOF OF THEOREM 1. We first prove (a). Note that
the optimality equation (2) can be written as
Vtðx; i; jÞ ¼ max
q1  0;q2  0
dt  d dt

RtðdÞ þ c1ðx dÞ
þ c1;iWtðxþ q1  d; xþ q1 þ q2  d; 1; jÞ
þð1 c1;iÞWtðx d; xþ q2  d; 0; jÞ

:
ðA7Þ
By replacing q1, q2, and d with ~q1 ¼ q1,
~q2 ¼ x þ q2  d, and ~d ¼ x  d, the optimality
equation (A7) can be rewritten as
Vtðx; i; jÞ ¼ max
~q1  0;~q2  ~d
dt  x~d dt

Rtðx ~dÞ
þ c1~dþ c1;iWtð~d ~q1; ~q2  ~q1; 1; jÞ
þ ð1 c1;iÞWtð~d; ~q2; 0; jÞ
	
:
ðA8Þ
Since Rt() is a concave function, Rtðx  ~dÞ is su-
permodular in ðx; ~dÞ. In addition, from the convexity
of Gt() and the concavity of Vt+1(x, i, j) in x from
Proposition 1, one can easily verify that
Wtð~d  ~q1; ~q2  ~q1; 1; jÞ and Wtð~d; ~q2; 0; jÞ are both
supermodular functions in ð~d; ~q1; ~q2Þ. Thus, the max-
imand in Equation (A8) is a supermodular function
in ðx; ~q1; ~q2; ~dÞ. Since the constraint in Equation (A8)
is a lattice, by applying Lemma 1, ~q1ðx; i; jÞ,
~q2ðx; i; jÞ and ~dt ðx; i; jÞ are all increasing in x. Note
that ~q1ðx; i; jÞ ¼ qt;1ðx; i; jÞ and ~q2ðx; i; jÞ ¼ xþ
qt;2ðx; i; jÞ  dt ðx; i; jÞ, and ~dtðx; i; jÞ ¼ x dt ðx; i; jÞ.
Thus, qt;1ðx; i; jÞ is decreasing in x while x
dt ðx; i; jÞ and x þ qt;2ðx; i; jÞ  dt ðx; i; jÞ are increas-
ing in x. Similarly, it can be shown that qt;2ðx; i; jÞ is
decreasing in x while x þ qt;1ðx; i; jÞ dt ðx; i; jÞ is
increasing in x. Now it remains to prove pt ðx; i; jÞ is
decreasing in x, or equivalently, dt ðx; i; jÞ is increas-
ing in x. To see this, define
V^tðz; i; jÞ ¼ max
q1  0;q2  0

c1;iWtðzþ q1; zþ q1 þ q2; 1; jÞ
þ ð1 c1;iÞWtðz; zþ q2; 0; jÞ

:
ðA9Þ
Then, the optimality equation (A7) can be simplified
and rewritten as
Vtðx; i; jÞ ¼ max
dt  d dt
RtðdÞ þ c1ðx dÞ þ V^tðx d; i; jÞ
n o
:
ðA10Þ
From the concavity of Vt+1(x, i, j) in x from Propo-
sition 1, it easily follows from Equations (A1) and
(A2) that Wt(x, y, i, j) is jointly concave in (x, y).
Then, it follows from Equation (A9) that V^tðz; i; jÞ is
concave in z and thus V^tðx d; i; jÞ is supermodular
in (x, d). Consequently, the maximand in Equation
(A10) is supermodular in (x, d). Since the constraint
in Equation (A10) is a lattice, by applying Lemma 1,
dt ðx; i; jÞ is increasing in x. Part (a) is proved.
For k = 1, 2, define nt;kði; jÞ ¼ supfxjqt;kðx; i; jÞ
[ 0g. Since qt;kðx; i; jÞ is decreasing in x from
part (a), qt;kðx; i; jÞ [ 0 when x < ξt,k(i, j) and
qt;kðx; i; jÞ ¼ 0 when x ≥ ξt,k(i, j). Thus, a reorder
point policy with reorder point value ξt,k(i, j) is opti-
mal for supplier k.
We next prove (b)–(d). We will only prove the
results when j is fixed; and a similar approach can
prove the results when i is fixed. Note from the
proof of Proposition 1 that, the maximand in Equa-
tion (A6) is a supermodular function in ðx; ~d; ~q2; iÞ
and the constraint in Equation (A6) is a lattice.
Then, by applying Lemma 1, ~dðx; i; jÞ and
~q2ðx; i; jÞ are both increasing in i. Thus,
~dðx; 1; jÞ  ~dðx; 0; jÞ and ~q2ðx; 1; jÞ  ~q2ðx; 0; jÞ.
Note that ~dðx; i; jÞ ¼ x  dt ðx; i; jÞ and ~q2ðx; 1; jÞ ¼
x þ qt;2ðx; i; jÞ  dt ðx; i; jÞ. Then, dt ðx; 1; jÞ 
dt ðx; 0; jÞ and qt;2ðx; 1; jÞ  dt ðx; 1; jÞ  qt;2ðx; 0; jÞ
dt ðx; 0; jÞ. Since pt ðx; i; jÞ ¼ ptðdt ðx; 1; jÞÞ and pt(d)
is decreasing in d, we obtain pt ðx; 1; jÞ  pt ðx; 0; jÞ.
Now we prove qt;1ðx; 1; jÞ  qt;1ðx; 0; jÞ. Define
~q1ðx; y; jÞ ¼ argmax
~q10
Wtðx~q1; y~q1; 1; jÞ. Then, from
the proof of Proposition 1, Wtðx~q1; y~q1; 1; jÞ is a
supermodular function in ðx; y; ~q1Þ. Since the con-
straint is a lattice, it follows from Lemma 1 that
~q1ðx; y; jÞ is increasing in x and y. According to
Equation (A7), we have the following identity
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qt;1ðx; i; jÞ¼~q1 xdt ðx; i; jÞ;xþqt;2ðx; i; jÞdt ðx; i; jÞ; j
 
:
Since ~q1ðx; y; jÞ is increasing in x and y,
dt ðx; 1; jÞ  dt ðx; 0; jÞ and qt;2ðx; 1; jÞ  d t ðx; 1; jÞ 
qt;2ðx; 0; jÞ  dt ðx; 0; jÞ, we obtain from the above
identity that qt;1ðx; 1; jÞ  qt;1ðx; 0; jÞ. h
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. We first prove (a). Since gt(z, j)
is concave in z, by the definition of zt;1ðjÞ, the
optimality equation (6) can be rewritten as
Vtðx; jÞ¼ max
dtddt

RtðdÞ c1dþgtðmaxfxd;zt;1ðjÞg; jÞ
	
þ c1x: ðA11Þ
Since gtðmaxfx  d; zt;1ðjÞg; jÞ is increasing in d and
equals gtðzt;1ðjÞ; jÞ when d  x  zt;1ðjÞ, it can be eas-
ily verified from Equation (A11) that dt ðx; jÞ ¼ d^t
and yt;1ðx; jÞ ¼ d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ when x  d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ;
while when x [ d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ, we have d^t 
dt ðx; jÞ  x  zt;1ðjÞ so yt;1ðx; jÞ ¼ x. Therefore, we
obtain yt;1ðx; jÞ ¼ maxfd^t þ zt;1ðjÞ; xg.
We next prove (b). By the definition of ft(z, 1) and
zt;2, it can be easily seen from Equation (3) that
yt;2ðx; jÞ ¼ dt ðx; jÞ þ arg max
y2  yt;1ðx;jÞdt ðx;jÞ
ftðy2; 1Þ
¼ maxfyt;1ðx; jÞ; dt ðx; jÞ þ zt;2g:
ðA12Þ
In addition, it can be summarized from the first part
of the proof that yt;1ðx; jÞ  dt;1ðx; jÞ þ zt;1ðjÞ for all
(x, j). Thus, when zt;1ðjÞ  zt;2, we have
yt;1ðx; jÞ  dt ðx; jÞ þ zt;2 thus yt;2ðx; jÞ ¼ yt;1ðx; jÞ.
Finally, the monotonicity results on dt ðx; jÞ directly
follow from Theorem 1.
We finally prove (c). When x  d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ, since
dt ðx; jÞ ¼ vd^t from the first part of the proof, it fol-
lows that pt ðx; jÞ ¼ ptðd^tÞ. When x [ d^t þ zt;1ðjÞ, the
results on pt ðx; jÞ directly follow from Theorem 1. h
PROOF OF THEOREM 4. We first prove (a) by induc-
tion. Since VTþ1ðx; jjclÞ ¼ 0, (a) is trivially true for
t = T + 1. Now assume inductively that (a) holds for
t + 1. To complete the proof for (a), we shall show
that (a) also holds for t. By Equation (4) and the
inductive assumption on Vtþ1ðx; jjclÞ, ftðz; jjclÞ is sub-
modular in (z, j), increasing in cl, and submodular
in (z, cl). From Equation (5),
gtðz; jj clÞ ¼  ðc1  ac2Þz GtðzÞ þmax
z z

c2;jftðz; 1j clÞ
þ ð1 c2;jÞftðz; 0j clÞ

:
ðA13Þ
In what follows, we first prove gtðz; jj clÞ is
increasing in cl and submodular in (z, cl). Depend-
ing on whether j equals l, we divide the analysis
into two cases.
When j = l, it follows from the above properties of
ftðz; jj clÞ and Lemma 2 that gtðz; jj clÞ is submodular
in (z, cl). Now suppose 0  cl\~cl  1. Then,
gtðz; lj ~clÞ þ ðc1  ac2Þzþ GtðzÞ
 clmax
z z
ftðz; 1j~clÞ þ ð1 clÞftðz; 0j~clÞ
 clmax
z z
ftðz; 1j clÞ þ ð1 clÞftðz; 0j clÞ
¼ gtðz; lj clÞ þ ðc1  ac2Þzþ GtðzÞ;
where the first inequality holds since
maxz z ftðz; 1j~clÞ ftðz; 1j~clÞ ftðz; 0j~clÞ; and the sec-
ond inequality holds since ftðz; 0j clÞ and ftðz; 1j clÞ
are both increasing in cl. Thus, gtðz; lj clÞ is increasing
in cl.
When j 6¼ l, since ftðz; 1j clÞ and ftðz; 0j clÞ are both
increasing in cl, gtðz; jj clÞ is also increasing in cl. In
addition, Equation (A13) can be rewritten as
gtðz; jj  clÞ ¼  ðc1  ac2Þz GtðzÞ
þmax
z z

c2;jftðz; 1j  clÞ
þ ð1 c2;jÞftðz; 0j  clÞ

:
Since ftðz; 1j  clÞ and ftðz; 0j  clÞ are both super-
modular functions and the constraint fðz;z; clÞjz zg
is a lattice, by applying Lemma 1, gtðz; j j  clÞ is
supermodular in (z, cl) hence gtðz; jj clÞ is submodu-
lar in (z, cl).
Now we prove part (a) for period t. By replacing
the decision variables y1 and d as ~y1 ¼ y1  d and
~d ¼ x  d, Equation (6) can be rewritten as
Vtðx; jj  clÞ ¼ max
~y1~d
dtx ~ddt
Rtðx ~dÞþ c1~dþ gtð~y; jj  clÞ
n o
:
ðA14Þ
Since Rt() is a concave function and gtð~y; jj  clÞ is
supermodular in ð~y; clÞ and decreasing in cl, it can
be easily verified from Equation (A14) that
Vtðx; jj  clÞ is decreasing in cl and supermodular in
(x, cl). Thus, Vtðx; jj clÞ is increasing in cl and sub-
modular in (x, cl). So (a) is proved.
We next prove (b). Note that zt;1ðjj clÞ ¼
argmaxz gtðz; jj clÞ and zt;2ðclÞ ¼ argmaxz ftðz; 1j clÞ.
Since gtðz; jj clÞ and ftðz; 1j clÞ are both submodular in
(z, cl), it directly follows from Lemma 1 that both
zt;1ðjj clÞ and zt;2ðclÞ are decreasing in cl. Note that
supplier 2 is never used in period T because of its
one-period lead time; so VT(x, j) and fT1(x, j) are
Gong, Chao, and Zheng: Dynamic Pricing and Inventory Management
2072 Production and Operations Management 23(12), pp. 2058–2074, © 2014 Production and Operations Management Society
both independent of cl. Hence, by its definition,
zT1;2ðclÞ is independent of cl. So (b) is proved.
We finally prove (c). First, from Equation ( A14),
it is easily seen that ~dðx; jj  clÞ is increasing in cl.
Thus, ~dðx; jj clÞ is decreasing in cl. Since ~dðx; jj clÞ ¼
x  dt ðx; jj clÞ and pt ðx; jj clÞ ¼ ptðdt ðx; jj clÞÞ, it fol-
lows that dt ðx; jj clÞ is increasing in cl while pt ðx; jj clÞ
is decreasing in cl. Next, from Theorem 3,
yt;1ðx; jj clÞ ¼ maxfd^t þ zt;1ðjj clÞ; xg, and thus, it
directly follows from part (b) that yt;1ðx; jj clÞ is
decreasing in cl. Finally, from Theorem 3, we have
yt;2ðx; jj clÞ  dt ðx; jj clÞ ¼ maxfyt;1ðx; jj clÞ
 dt ðx; jj clÞ; zt;2ðclÞg:
Since yt;1ðx; jj clÞ and zt;2ðclÞ are decreasing in cl
while dt ðx; jj clÞ is increasing in cl, it follows from
the above identity that yt;2ðx; jj clÞ  dt ðx; jj clÞ is
decreasing in cl. When t = T  1, from Equation (8),
we have
qT1;2ðx; jjclÞ ¼ maxfdT1ðx; jjclÞ  yT1;1ðx; jjclÞ
þ zT1;2ðclÞ; 0g:
Note that zT1;2ðclÞ is independent of cl from (b).
Thus, qT1;2ðx; jjclÞ is increasing in cl. So (c) is pro-
ved. h
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